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Different thought experiments have been offered to argue for the 
skeptical claim that sound empirical knowledge is impossible. One 
of these thought experiments assumes that we are eternal brains in 
a vat with systematically delusory experiences. In (Putnam 1981), 
Putnam responds to the skeptical challenge that contrary to our 
initial assumption we can know a priori, i.e. independent from 
experience, that we aren’t eternal brains in a vat. Putnam argues 
that the skeptical hypothesis that we are eternal brains in a vat is 
inconsistent with the received view regarding reference and truth, 
semantic externalism, which says that a referential expression e 
refers to an object o if and only if e is appropriately causally 
related to o. There are different versions of Putnam’s argument. In 
this paper, I will discuss the three main versions of the argument; 
i.e. a reconstruction of Putnam’s original argument in (Putnam 
1981), Brueckner’s simple argument (Brueckner 2003; 2016, 
Section 3 and 4), and a reconstruction of Brueckner’s disjunctive 
argument (Brueckner 2016, Section 4). It is generally assumed that 
Putnam’s original argument does not show that the skeptical 
hypothesis that we are eternal brains in a vat is inconsistent with 
semantic externalism. In this paper, I will argue that the same is 
true of Brueckner’s simple argument and of Brueckner’s disjunctive 
argument. Although from this it won’t follow that semantic 
externalism is consistent with the skeptical hypothesis, it will show 
that it is also not yet decided that it is not. !
Keywords: Brain-in-a-vat Scenario, Skeptical Challenge, Semantic 
Externalism, Hilary Putnam !
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1. Introduction !
Different thought experiments have been offered to argue for the 
skeptical claim that sound empirical knowledge is impossible. For 
example, it has been argued that since the experiences of a brain in a vat 
whose sensory impressions are generated by a supercomputer are 
qualitatively indistinguishable from the experiences of a normal 
perceiver, we cannot rule out that we are eternal brains in a vat  with 1
systematically delusory experiences. Moreover, it seems that if we are 
eternal brains in a vat with systematically delusory experiences, our 
beliefs concerning the external world are false. Since fallible knowledge, 
knowledge despite uneliminated possibilities of error, seems to be a 
contradiction in terms, the skeptic concludes that sound empirical 
knowledge is impossible. This is also known as the skeptical challenge or 
the skeptical argument. 
In (Putnam 1981), Putnam responds to the skeptical challenge that the 
hypothesis that we are eternal brains in a vat is inconsistent with the 
received view regarding reference and truth; i.e. semantic externalism. 
According to semantic externalism, a referential expression e refers to an 
object/kind o if and only if e is appropriately causally related to o. This 
means that there is a causal relation of the right kind between e and o; 
e.g. a Kripkean chain of communication. Since we can know a priori that 
semantic externalism is true, Putnam’s argument goes, we can know a 
priori that we aren’t eternal brains in a vat. 
There are different versions of Putnam’s argument. In this paper, I will 
discuss the three main versions of the argument; i.e. a reconstruction of 
Putnam’s original argument in (Putnam 1981), Brueckner’s simple 
argument (Brueckner 2003; 2016, Section 3 and 4), and a reconstruction 
of Brueckner’s disjunctive argument in (Brueckner 2016, Section 4). It is 
generally assumed that Putnam’s original argument does not show that 
the skeptical argument is not sound; i.e. that one of its premises is false. 
In this paper, I will argue that the same is true of Brueckner’s simple 
argument and of Brueckner’s disjunctive argument. Although from this it 
won’t follow that semantic externalism is consistent with the premises of 
the skeptical argument, it will show that it is also not yet decided that it is 
not.  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 Eternal brains in a vat are brains that have been envatted for their entire life. The 1
alternative to an eternal brain in a vat is a recently envatted brain in a vat. In this paper, I 
will concentrate on the eternal-envatment scenario. First of all, the recent-envatment 
scenario lacks the skeptical power of the eternal-envatment scenario, since as a recently 
envatted brain in a vat I still have true beliefs concerning the external world like my belief 
that I was born in Italy (Brueckner 2016, Section 4). Second of all, in this paper, I will 
concentrate on Putnam’s argument against the skeptical challenge, and Putnam’s 
argument is only an argument against the claim that we are eternal brains in a vat.
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, I will present the 
skeptical argument in more detail. In section 2, I will discuss Putnam’s 
original argument and Brueckner’s objection to Putnam’s argument that 
the argument is epistemically circular (Brueckner 1986). Following this 
(section 3), I will present Brueckner’s simplification of Putnam’s 
argument, and I will argue that neither Brueckner’s simple argument nor 
Putnam’s original argument is epistemically circular. 
In section 4, I will argue that although neither Putnam’s argument nor 
Brueckner’s simple argument is epistemically circular, neither Putnam’s 
argument nor Brueckner’s simple argument shows that the skeptical 
hypothesis that we are eternal brains in a vat is inconsistent with semantic 
externalism. For example, following (Brueckner 2016, Section 4), I will 
argue that both Brueckner’s simple argument and Putnam’s argument 
contain a premise whose truth can only be known via experience. Since 
an argument against the skeptical claim that sound empirical knowledge 
is impossible should not contain premises whose truth can only be known 
via experience, it will follow that neither Putnam’s argument nor 
Brueckner’s simple argument shows that the skeptical hypothesis that we 
are eternal brains in a vat is inconsistent with semantic externalism. I will 
call this ‘the problem of a posteriori truths’. 
To avoid the problem of a posteriori truths, following the simple 
argument, Brueckner (2016, Section 4) presents a disjunctive argument. 
In section 5, I will try to reconstruct Brueckner’s disjunctive argument. 
Following this (section 6), I will argue that although Brueckner’s 
disjunctive argument avoids the problem of a posteriori truths, just like 
Putnam’s argument and Brueckner’s simple argument, it does not show 
that one of the premises of the skeptical argument is false. This will 
question the claim that semantic externalism is not consistent with the 
premises of the skeptical argument. 
!
2. The Skeptical Challenge !
The brain-in-a-vat thought experiment assumes that we are eternal brains 
in a vat whose sensory impressions are generated by a supercomputer; i.e. 
the supercomputer produces electrical impulses that stimulate the brain 
just like normal brains are stimulated as a result of perceiving external 
objects. Therefore, we can assume that the experiences of an eternal brain 
in a vat are qualitatively indistinguishable from the experiences of a 
normal perceiver. For example, the computer-generated experiences of 
trees are qualitatively indistinguishable from the experiences of trees of a 
normal perceiver. Following this, the skeptic argues as follows for the 
claim that sound empirical knowledge is impossible. 
If the experiences of an eternal brain in a vat are qualitatively 
indistinguishable from the experiences of a normal perceiver, then,  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according to the skeptic, we cannot rule out that we are eternal brains in a 
vat with systematically delusory experiences. 
(A1) I don’t know that I am not an eternal brain in a vat with 
systematically delusory experiences. 
For example, the computer program features would have us believe that 
we have hands, can walk etc. I will call an eternal brain in a vat with 
systematically delusory experiences a ‘BIV’, and I will call the claim that 
I am an eternal brain in a vat with systematically delusory experiences 
‘the skeptical hypothesis’. 
(SH) I am an eternal brain in a vat with systematically delusory 
experiences. 
If I am a BIV, the skeptic continues, then the propositions concerning the 
external world which I think I know to be true are false. 
(A2) For an arbitrary proposition p concerning the external world 
which I think I know to be true: If I am a BIV, then p is false. 
Take, for example, my belief that I have hands. If based on the computer-
generated experiences I come to believe the proposition that I have hands, 
then, according to the skeptic, I am sadly mistaken. Since, according to 
(A1), I cannot rule out that I am a BIV, it would follow that I cannot rule 
out that the propositions concerning the external world which I think I 
know to be true are false. Since fallible knowledge, knowledge despite 
uneliminated possibilities of error, seems to be a contradiction in terms, 
the skeptic concludes that sound empirical knowledge is impossible. 
There are several possible responses to the above argument. For example, 
Lewis (1979) modifies the claim that knowledge implies that all 
possibilities of error have been ruled out by replacing (A3) with (A3*). 
(A3) An agent A knows a proposition p if and only if p holds in 
every (epistemic) possibility left uneliminated by A’s 
evidence. 
(A3*) An agent A knows a proposition p if and only if p holds in 
every (epistemic) possibility left uneliminated by A’s 
evidence – Psst! – except for those possibilities that we are 
properly ignoring. 
Here an epistemic possibility with respect to A’s evidence is a 
(metaphysically) possible world w such that A’s evidence does not rule 
out that w is actual. Following this, Lewis notes that unless we deal with 
epistemology and skeptical scenarios we usually ignore the possibility 
that we are eternal brains in a vat. According to such a solution, ‘know’ is 
context-dependent. For example, with an utterance of ‘I know that I have 
hands’ I would say something true as long as my interlocutors and I 
ignore skeptical scenarios like the brain-in-a-vat scenario.  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However, following (Putnam 1981), the standard response to the 
skeptical argument is that we can rule out a priori that we are BIVs. As 
said above, Putnam argues that the skeptical hypothesis that we are BIVs 
is inconsistent with the received view regarding reference and truth; i.e. 
semantic externalism. Since, according to Putnam, semantic externalism 
is a priori true, Putnam concludes that we can rule out a priori that we are 
BIVs. In the next section, I will examine Putnam’s argument in more 
detail. !
3. Putnam’s Argument !
The claim that a referential expression e refers to an object/kind o if and 
only if e is appropriately causally related to o goes back to Putnam 
(1975), Kripke (1980) and Donnellan (1970). For example, Kripke and 
Donnellan argue that the referent of an ordinary name like ‘Napoleon’ is 
not determined by the properties that the speaker associates with the 
name, but by a so-called chain of communication. Kripke extends this 
claim to natural kind terms like ‘tiger’, ‘water’ and ‘brain’. Since, in this 
paper, I will examine the question whether the skeptical hypothesis that I 
am a BIV is not consistent with semantic externalism, in what follows I 
will simply assume that semantic externalism (SE) is true. 
(SE) My utterances of a referential expression e refer to an object/
kind o if and only if they are appropriately causally related to 
o. 
Following (SE), Putnam (1981) argues as follows for the claim that the 
skeptical hypothesis that I am a BIV is false. Assume that I am a BIV. 
Then my utterances of ‘brain’ are not appropriately causally related to 
brains, but to one of the following candidates (Brueckner 1986, cf. 2012, 
11): 
(i) to the succession of experiences had by the BIV which are 
comparable to the experiences of brains of a normal perceiver, 
(ii) to the electrical impulses that stimulate the brain and thereby 
cause it to have experiences just like those described in (i), or 
(iii) to the computer program features that are causally responsible 
for the stimuli described in (ii). 
Lets say that ‘brain*’ stands for one of the three candidates. Together 
with semantic externalism, it follows that my utterances of ‘I am not a 
BIV’ are true if and only if it is not the case that I am a BIV*. Since, if I 
am a BIV, it is not the case that I am a BIV*, it follows that as a BIV I say 
something true with my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’. 




(1.) I am a BIV. (Assumption, Conditional Proof (CP)) 
(n.) I am not a BIV. 
(n+1) If I am a BIV, then I am not a BIV. (1−(n+1), CP) 
(.:) I am not a BIV. (from (n+1)) 
However, this presupposes that (DW) is true. 
(DW) My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true if and only if I am 
not a BIV. 
If (DW) is true, then we get the following argument for the claim that I 
am not a BIV (PA): 
(1.) I am a BIV. (Assumption, CP) 
(2.) If I am a BIV, then my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are 
true if and only if I am not a BIV*. (from (SE) and the 
Skeptical Scenario) 
(3.) If I am a BIV, then I am not a BIV*. 
(4.) If I am a BIV, then my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are 
true. (from 2 and 3) 
(5.) My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true. (from 1 and 
4) 
(6.) My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true if and only if I 
am not a BIV. (from (DW)) 
(7.) I am not a BIV. (from 5 and 6) 
(8.) If I am a BIV, then I am not a BIV. (1−7, CP) 
(.:) I am not a BIV. (from 8) 
PA is logically valid. However, Brueckner (1986, cf. 2012, 24-5) objects 
to PA that in order to know that (DW) is the correct statement of the truth-
conditions of my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’, and not (DW*), I need to 
know that I am not a BIV (speaking English). 
(DW*) My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true if and only if I 
am not a BIV*. 
Therefore, following (Alston 1989), Brueckner (2016, Section 2) calls 
Putnam’s argument epistemically circular; knowledge of one of its 
premises requires knowledge of its conclusion.  
Before I will discuss Brueckner’s objection to Putnam’s argument in 
more detail, I will briefly present Brueckner’s version of Putnam’s 
argument. Following this, I will argue that neither Brueckner’s argument 
nor Putnam’s argument is epistemically circular.  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4. The Simple Argument !
In (Brueckner 2003) and (Brueckner 2016, Section 3), Brueckner 
proposes the following simplification (SA) of Putnam’s argument:  2
(1.) My word ‘tree’ refers to trees. 
(2.) If I am a BIV, then it is not the case that my word ‘tree’ refers 
to trees. 
(.:) I am not a BIV. (from 1 and 2) 
For premise (2) we can argue again with semantic externalism: 
(1.) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ is not causally related trees. 
(from the Skeptical Scenario) 
(2.) If my word ‘tree’ is not causally related to trees, then my word 
‘tree’ does not refer to trees. (from (SE)) 
(. :) If I am a BIV, then it is not the case that my word ‘tree’ refers 
to trees. (from 1 and 2) 
Premise (1) follows from the description of the skeptical scenario. If I am 
a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ is not causally related to trees, but only to 
trees*. Premise (2), on the other hand, follows again from semantic 
externalism. 
What about premise (1) of SA? Prima facie, premise (1) of SA leads to the 
same problem as premise (6) of PA. It seems that in order to know that 
my word ‘tree’ refers to trees, and not to trees*, I need to know that I am 
not a BIV (speaking English). 
(DR) My word ‘tree’ refers to trees. 
(DR*) My word ‘tree’ refers to trees*. 
However, Brueckner (2016, Section 4) notes that in order to know that 
(DR) is true I only need to know the meaning of ‘refer’ and the meaning 
of quotations marks. Then, I can know (a priori) that disquotation can be 
correctly applied to any referring term of my language, and that sentences 
like (DR) are true. Moreover, since disquotational principles like (DR) are 
metaphysically neutral, (DR) does not exclude that (DR*) is true. 
Therefore, in order to know that (DR) is true, I don’t need to know that I 
am not a BIV. 
However, the same seems to be true of (DW). For example, following the 
above argument, an advocate of PA could argue that since we know the 
meaning of ‘true’ and the meaning of quotation marks, we can know (a 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priori) that disquotation can be correctly applied to any truth-bearing 
sentence of our language, and that sentences like (DW) are true. 
Moreover, since, just like (DR), (DW) is metaphysically neutral, (DW) 
does not exclude that (DW*) is true. It follows that in order to know that 
(DW) is true I don’t need to know that I am not a BIV. 
We see that contrary to Brueckner’s assumption neither Brueckner’s 
argument nor Putnam’s argument seems to be epistemically circular. 
However, if I know the meaning of ‘refer’ and the meaning of quotation 
marks, then I only know that disquotation can be correctly applied to any 
successfully referring term of my language. Therefore, strictly speaking, a 
priori, I can only know that (1*) is true. 
(1*) If my word ‘tree’ refers, then it refers to trees. 
Following this, we have to reformulate Brueckner’s simple argument as 
follows (Brueckner 2003; 2016, Section 4): 
(1.*) If my word ‘tree’ refers, then it refers to trees. (Disquotation) 
(2.*) If I am a BIV, then it is not the case that if my word ‘tree’ 
refers, then it refers to trees. (from (SE) and the Skeptical Scenario) 
(.:) I am not a BIV. (from 1* and 2*) 
A similar problem arises in connection with Putnam’s original argument. 
If I know the meaning of ‘true’ and the meaning of quotation marks, then 
I only know that disquotation can be correctly applied to any truth-
bearing sentence of my language. This means that strictly speaking, a 
priori, I can only know that (6*) is true. 
(6*) If my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are truth-bearing, then 
they are true if and only if I am not a BIV. 
Following this, we have to reformulate Putnam’s argument as follows: 
(1.) I am a BIV. (Assumption, CP) 
(2.) If I am a BIV, then my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true if 
and only if I am not a BIV*. (from (SE) and the Skeptical 
Scenario) 
(3.) If I am a BIV, then I am not a BIV*. 
(4.) If I am a BIV, then my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true. 
(from 2 and 3) 
(5.) My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true. (from 1 and 4) 
(6.*) If my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are truth-bearing, then 
my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true if and only if I am 
not a BIV. (Disquotation)  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(7) If my utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true, then they are 
truth-bearing. 
(8.) I am not a BIV. (from 5, 6* and 7) 
(9.) If I am a BIV, then I am not a BIV. (1−8, CP) 
(.:) I am not a BIV. (from 9) 
We see that both Brueckner’s simple argument and Putnam’s argument 
are still logically valid if we replace premise (1) with premise (1*) and if 
we replace premise (6) with premise (6*) (respectively). Moreover, since 
both (DR) and (DW) are simply instances of Tarski’s disquotational 
principles for reference and truth, neither Putnam’s argument nor 
Brueckner’s argument seems to be epistemically circular. Nevertheless, in 
the next section, we will see that neither Putnam’s argument nor 
Brueckner’s argument shows that I am not a BIV. For example, we will 
see that both Putnam’s argument and Brueckner’s argument contain a 
premise whose truth can only be known a posteriori; i.e via experience. !
5. The Problem of A Posteriori Truths !
As we have seen above, we have to reformulate Brueckner’s simple 
argument as follows: 
(1.*) If my word ‘tree’ refers, then it refers to trees. (Disquotation) 
(2.*) If I am a BIV, then it is not the case that if my word ‘tree’ 
refers, then it refers to trees. (from (SE) and the Skeptical 
Scenario) 
(.:) I am not a BIV. (from 1* and 2*) 
Premise (2*) is logically equivalent to (T): 
(T) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ refers, and it is not the case 
that my word ‘tree’ refers to trees. 
This leads to the question, how an advocate of semantic externalism 
could argue for premise (2*). For example, the following won’t do. 
(1.) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ is not causally related trees. 
(from the Skeptical Scenario) 
(2.) If my word ‘tree’ is not causally related to trees, then my word 
‘tree’ refers, and it is not the case that my word ‘tree’ refers to 
trees. 
(. :) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ refers, and it is not the case 
that my word ‘tree’ refers to trees. (from 1 and 2)  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From the fact that my word ‘tree’ is not causally related to trees, it does 
not follow together with semantic externalism that my word ‘tree’ refers. 
Therefore, premise (2) does not follow from semantic externalism. 
An advocate of Brueckner’s simple argument seems to be left with the 
following option: 
(1.) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ is only appropriately 
causally related to trees*. (from the Skeptical Scenario) 
(2.) If my word ‘tree’ is only appropriately causally related to 
trees*, then it is not appropriately causally related to trees. 
(3.) If my word ‘tree’ is appropriately causally related to trees*, 
then my word ‘tree’ refers. (from SE) 
(4.) If my word ‘tree’ is not appropriately causally related to trees, 
then it is not the case that my word ‘tree’ refers to trees. (from 
SE) 
(. :) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ refers, and it is not the case 
that my word ‘tree’ refers to trees. (from 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
Both premise (3) and premise (4) follow from semantic externalism. 
However, premise (2) is problematic. 
As Brueckner (2016, Section 4) rightly points out, premise (2) 
presupposes that (G1) is true. 
(G1) Trees ≠ trees*. 
Prima facie, this seems to be unproblematic, since it seems to be obvious 
that trees* are not trees. However, Brueckner notes that we can only 
know via experience that trees are not computer program features. 
Therefore, we can only know via experience that trees* are not trees. 
Since an argument against the skeptical claim that sound empirical 
knowledge is impossible should not contain premises whose truth can 
only be known via experience, it follows that Brueckner’s simple 
argument does not show that I am not a BIV. 
A similar problem also arises in connection with PA. As we have seen 
above, PA contains the following premise: 
(3.) If I am a BIV, then I am not a BIV*. 
This presupposes that (G2) is true. 
(G2) BIVs ≠ BIVs*. 
However, since we can only know via experience that BIVs are not 
computer program features, also (G2) is a posteriori true if true. I will call 
this ‘the problem of a posteriori truths’.  
82
Brains in Vats and Semantic Externalism: New Hope for the Skeptic
To avoid the problem of a posteriori truths, following the simple 
argument, Brueckner (2016, Section 4) presents a disjunctive argument. 
Therefore, next, I will try to reconstruct Brueckner’s disjunctive 
argument, and I will show how it avoids the problem of a posteriori 
truths. !
6. Brueckner’s Disjunctive Argument !
In (Brueckner 2016, Section 4), Brueckner addresses the problem of a 
posteriori truths by drawing our attention to (A2). 
(A2) For an arbitrary proposition p concerning the external world 
which I think I know to be true: If I am a BIV, then p is false. 
For example, Brueckner argues that if (G1) is true, then (A2*) is true. 
(A2*) There is a proposition p concerning the external world which 
I think I know to be true such that if I am a BIV, then p is 
true. 
It would follow that (G1) is not consistent with (A2). 
Brueckner’s argument runs as follows. Assume that trees are trees*. 
Together with (DG), it would follow that (DG*) is true. 
(DG) The proposition that I am in the presence of trees is true if 
and only if I am in the presence of trees. 
(DG*) The proposition that I am in the presence of trees is true if 
and only if I am in the presence of trees*. 
Moreover, if (DG*) is true, then the proposition that I am in the presence 
of trees is true if I am a BIV, since, as a BIV, I am in the presence of 
trees*. It would follow that in order to know the proposition that I am in 
the presence of trees I don’t have to rule out that I am a BIV. 
Following this, Brueckner (2016, Section 4) proposes a disjunctive 
argument which can be reconstructed as follows: 
(1.) Either trees = trees*, or trees ≠ trees*. 
(2) Trees ≠ trees*. (Assumption, Disjunctive Proof (DP)) 
(2.1) If my word ‘tree’ refers, then it refers to trees. (Disquotation)  
(2.2) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ is only appropriately 
causally related to trees*. (from the Skeptical Scenario)  
(2.3) If my word ‘tree’ is only appropriately causally related to 




(2.4) If my word ‘tree’ is appropriately causally related to trees*, 
then my word ‘tree’ refers. (from SE) 
(2.5) If my word ‘tree’ is not appropriately causally related to trees, 
then it is not the case that my word ‘tree’ refers to trees. 
(from SE) 
(2.6) If I am a BIV, then my word ‘tree’ refers, and it is not the case 
that my word ‘tree’ refers to trees. (from 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5) 
(2.7) I am not a BIV. (from 2.1 and 2.6) 
(3.)   Trees = trees*. (Assumption, DP) 
(3.1) The proposition that I am in the presence of trees is true if 
and only if I am in the presence of trees. 
(3.2) The proposition that I am in the presence of trees is true if 
and only if I am in the presence of trees*. (from 3 and 3.1) 
(3.3) If I am a BIV, then I am in the presence of trees*. 
(3.4) If I am a BIV, then the proposition that I am in the presence of 
trees is true. (from 3.2 and 3.3) 
(3.5) I believe the proposition that I am in the presence of trees. 
(Introspection) 
(3.6) The proposition that I am in the presence of trees is a 
proposition concerning the external world. 
(3.7) There is a proposition p concerning the external world which 
I think I know to be true such that if I am a BIV, then p is 
true. (from 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6) 
(. :) I am not a BIV, or there is a proposition p concerning the 
external world which I think I know to be true such that if I 
am a BIV, then p is true. (from 2.7 and 3.7, DP) 
Premise (1) is a priori true, since we can know a priori that either trees = 
trees*, or trees ≠ trees*. With the above argument, Brueckner infers from 
this that I am not a BIV, or there is a proposition p concerning the 
external world which I think I know to be true such that if I am a BIV, 
then p is true. According to Brueckner, the skeptic loses in each case. 
Prima facie, the questionable premises of the above reconstruction of 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument are (3.1) and (3.3). For example, the 
skeptic could object that (3.1) presupposes that the proposition that I am 
in the presence of trees is about trees, and not about trees*. Therefore, the 
objection continues, (3.1) presupposes that I am not a BIV. However, just 
like (DW) and (DR), (3.1) is metaphysically neutral. This means that (3.1) 
does not exclude that trees = trees*, and, therefore, (3.1) does not 
presuppose that I am not a BIV. 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For premise (3.3), on the other hand, we can argue as follows: 
(1) I have treeish experiences. (Introspection) 
(2) If I am a BIV and I have treeish experiences, then I am in the 
presence of trees*. (from the Skeptical Scenario) 
(.:) If I am a BIV, then I am in the presence of trees*.(from 1 and 2) 
Premise (2) follows from the description of the skeptical scenario. If I am 
a BIV, then my treeish experiences are generated by computer program 
features. Since these computer program features are trees*, it follows that 
as a BIV I can only have treeish experiences if I am in the presence of 
trees*. 
We see that by drawing our attention to the dialectical situation between 
skeptic and anti-skeptic Brueckner can avoid the problem of a posteriori 
truths. Nevertheless, next, we will see that Brueckner’s disjunctive 
argument is still problematic in the light of the skeptical challenge 
presented in section 1. 
!
7. The Skeptical Challenge Again !
In section 1, we saw that the skeptic can argue as follows for the claim 
that sound empirical knowledge is impossible: 
(A1) I don’t know that I am not a BIV. 
(A2) For an arbitrary proposition p concerning the external world 
which I think I know to be true: If I am a BIV, then p is false. 
(A3) An agent A knows a proposition p if and only if p holds in 
every (epistemic) possibility left uneliminated by A’s 
evidence. 
(. :) For an arbitrary proposition p concerning the external world 
which I think I know to be true: I don’t know p. 
Therefore, if we want to avoid the skeptic’s conclusion that sound 
empirical knowledge is impossible, we have to show that one of the 
premises of the above argument is false. As we have seen, with Putnam’s 
argument and with Brueckner’s simple argument advocates of semantic 
externalism tried to show that contrary to the skeptic’s assumption I can 
know that I am not a BIV. However, since both arguments contain a 
premise whose truth can only be known a posteriori, i.e. via experience, 
neither Putnam’s argument nor Brueckner’s simple argument can be used 




What about Brueckner’s disjunctive argument? Does Brueckner’s 
disjunctive argument show that one of the premises of the skeptical 
argument is false? I will argue that it does not. Brueckner’s disjunctive 
argument only shows that I am not a BIV, or that there is a proposition p 
concerning the external world which I think I know to be true such that p 
is true if I am a BIV. From this it does not follow that I know that I am 
not a BIV, or there is a proposition p concerning the external world which 
I think I know to be true such that p is true if I am a BIV. Therefore, 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument does not show that (A1) or (A2) is 
false. Moreover, the argument neither shows that (A2) is false, nor that 
(A1) is false. For example, following Brueckner’s disjunctive argument, I 
only know (a priori) that I am not a BIV, or that there is a proposition p 
concerning the external world which I think I know to be true such that p 
is true if I am a BIV. Hence, following Brueckner’s disjunctive argument, 
I still cannot rule out (a priori) that I am not a BIV. 
An advocate of Brueckner’s disjunctive argument could respond that 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument shows that if I am a BIV, then there is a 
proposition p concerning the external world which I think I know to be 
true such that p is true if I am a BIV. In other words, the argument shows 
that if (A2) is true, then I am not a BIV. Following this, an advocate of 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument could argue as follows against the 
skeptical argument. 
I know a priori that either (A2) is true, or that (A2) is false. Assume that 
(A2) is false. Then, the skeptical argument is not sound. Next, assume 
that (A2) is true. Then, it follows together with the conclusion of 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument that I am not a BIV. Therefore, an 
advocate of Brueckner’s disjunctive argument may conclude that 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument shows that either (A2) is false, or I can 
rule out that I am a BIV. Either way, it would follow that the skeptical 
argument is not sound. 
However, if we look at the argument in more detail, we see that it does 
not show that the skeptical argument is not sound, but that it only shows 
that either the skeptical argument is not sound, or I am not a BIV. 
(1) Either (A2) is true, or (A2) is false. 
(2) (A2) is false. (Assumption, DP) 
(2.1) If (A2) is false, the skeptical argument is not sound. 
(2.2) The skeptical argument is not sound. (from 2 and 2.1) 
(3) (A2) is true. (Assumption, DP) 
(3.1) If (A2) is true, then I am not a BIV. (Brueckner’s Disjunctive 
Argument) 
(3.2) I am not a BIV. (from 3 and 3.1)  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(. :) Either the skeptical argument is not sound, or I am not a BIV. 
(from 2.2 and 3.2, DP) 
From this it does not follow that either the skeptical argument is not 
sound, or I know that I am not a BIV. This was to be expected, since also 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument only shows that (A2) is false, or I am 
not a BIV. As said above, from this it does not follow that (A2) is false, or 
I know that I am not a BIV. 
Let us recap: Brueckner’s disjunctive argument neither shows that (A1) is 
false, nor that (A2) is false, nor that (A1) or (A2) is false. It follows that 
just like Putnam’s argument and Brueckner’s simple argument 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument does not show that one of the premises 
of the skeptical argument is false. Therefore, also Brueckner’s disjunctive 
argument does not avoid the skeptic’s conclusion that sound empirical 
knowledge is impossible. !
8. Conclusion !
Although neither Brueckner’s simple argument nor Putnam’s argument 
seems to be epistemically circular, neither Brueckner’s simple argument 
nor Putnam’s argument shows that the skeptical hypothesis that I am a 
BIV is inconsistent with semantic externalism. For example, both 
Brueckner’s simple argument and Putnam’s argument contain a premise 
whose truth can only be known via experience. Since an argument against 
the skeptical claim that sound empirical knowledge is impossible should 
not contain premises whose truth can only be known via experience, it 
follows that neither Brueckner’s simple argument nor Putnam’s argument 
shows that (A1) is false. 
Following this, Brueckner argues for the weaker claim that if semantic 
externalism is true, then I don’t have to rule out that I am a BIV in order 
to possess sound empirical knowledge, or I am not a BIV. According to 
Brueckner, the skeptic loses in each case. However, as we have seen 
above, just like Putnam’s argument and Brueckner’s simple argument, 
Brueckner’s disjunctive argument does not show that one of the premises 
of the skeptical argument is false. Although from this it does not follow 
that semantic externalism is consistent with the premises of the skeptical 
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